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Reznik: Identity Theft on Social Networking

IDENTITY THEFT ON SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES:
DEVELOPING ISSUES OF INTERNET IMPERSONATION
Maksim Reznik*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In New Jersey, a woman was prosecuted for identity theft
after creating a fake Facebook profile that depicted her ex-boyfriend,
a narcotics detective, as a sexual deviant and a drug addict.1
Similarly, in California, a teenager who stole his classmate‟s
Facebook password to post sexually explicit material about the victim
was sentenced to a period not to exceed one year in a juvenile
detention center.2 This Comment focuses on the dangers of social
media sites when a person gains access to another‟s online account
through two different methods: (1) stealing the third party‟s
password,3 or (2) creating a completely fake profile and subsequently
impersonating that person.4
Social networking sites have become an integral part of how
our society interacts on a daily basis.5 Facebook, the current leader in
*

J.D. Candidate 2013, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg School of Law; B.A. 2010,
University of Massachusetts, Amherst. I would like to thank my friends and family for
supporting me during the journey of law school and life. I would also like to thank the
Touro Law Review and the Touro Law faculty for making the publication of this article a
possibility.
1
Mark Hansen, NJ Woman Can Be Prosecuted over Fake Facebook Profile, Judge Rules,
A.B.A. J. (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/woman_can_be_prosecuted_
over_fake_facebook_profile_judge_rules; see FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com (last
visited Nov. 19, 2012).
2
In re Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 49, 52 (Ct. App. 2011).
3
See id. (discussing a case where a teenager received the password to a fellow classmate‟s
email account by means of an unsolicited text message and used this information to access
the classmate‟s Facebook account).
4
See Draker v. Schreiber, 271 S.W.3d 318, 320-21 (Tex. App. 2008) (illustrating a case in
which two students created a fake website profile of their principal on MySpace.com).
5
Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and
Scholarship, available at http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/boyd.ellison.html. Social
networking sites are “web-based services that allow individuals to . . . construct a public or

455

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 [2013], Art. 12

456

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

social networking sites, has approximately eight hundred and fortyfive million active users,6 and that number is expected to exceed one
billion by the end of 2012.7 Recent studies show that eighty-five
percent of college students spend a weekly average of 6.2 hours on
Facebook.8 Twitter,9 which emerged in 2006 as a way to send status
updates via text messages, currently has 200 million registered
accounts, and experts expect that number to reach 900 million by the
end of 2012.10 It can safely be assumed that social media sites will
continue to grow and provide services for millions of individuals and
companies.
Such excessive growth of social media sites has led to an
increasing number of Internet impersonation cases in the United
States.11 This Comment focuses mainly on criminal liability for
perpetrators of Internet impersonation, as opposed to the civil
context, in which victims can sue perpetrators in tort.12 The purpose
of this Comment is to identify how states are actively attempting to
prevent online impersonation and to propose a federal statute to
combat online impersonation. This statute is based upon California
and New York statutes,13 but also explicitly applies to the two
semi-public profile within a bounded system.” Id. Users then “articulate a list of other users
with whom they share a connection, and . . . view and traverse their lists of
connections . . . made by others within the system.” Id.
6
Anson Alexander, Facebook User Statistics 2012 [Infographic], ANSON ALEX (Feb. 20,
2012), http://ansonalex.com/infographics/facebook-user-statistics-2012-infographic/.
7
Priit Kallas, Social Media Trends 2012: More Than 1 Billion People Using Facebook,
DREAM GROW (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.dreamgrow.com/social-media-trends-2012-morethan-1-billion-people-using-facebook/.
8
Jamison Barr & Emmy Lugus, Digital Threats on Campus: Examining the Duty of
Colleges to Protect Their Social Networking Students, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 757, 761
(2011).
9
TWITTER, http://www.twitter.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2012).
10
Shea Bennett, Twitter on Track for 500 Million Total Users by March, 250 Million
Active
Users
by
End
of
2012,
MEDIA BISTRO
(Jan.
13,
2012),
http://www.mediabistro.com/alltwitter/twitter-active-total-users_b17655.
11
Bradley Kay, Article, Extending Tort Liability to Creators of Fake Profiles on Social
Networking Websites, 10 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 3 (2010).
12
Id. at 17 (“The causes of action for misappropriation of name or likeness and violation
of right of publicity have been extended to acts committed over the Internet.”).
13
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(4) (McKinney 2008) (“A person is guilty of criminal
impersonation . . . when he . . . [i]mpersonates another by communication by [I]nternet
website or electronic means with intent to obtain a benefit or injure or defraud another, or by
such communication pretends to be a public servant in order to induce another to submit to
such authority or act in reliance on such pretense.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5 (West 2011)
(setting forth that “any person who knowingly and without consent credibly impersonates
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methods of Internet impersonation within the statutory language.14
Section II discusses the emerging nationwide problem of Internet
impersonation and provides examples of the two methods of online
impersonation. Section III explains how certain states are attempting
to solve the problem of Internet impersonation. Finally, section IV
proposes solutions to limit the negative effects of online
impersonation, including an ideal statute that the federal government
and states should adopt when dealing with this issue.
II.

METHODS TO PERPETRATE IDENTITY THEFT ON SOCIAL
MEDIA SITES

Identity theft on the Internet can arise in two similar yet
distinct ways. The more common scenario of identity theft on the
Internet arises when the perpetrator creates a fictitious profile of the
victim and subsequently uses that identity for online
communications.15 The second method occurs when the perpetrator
steals a victim‟s password or indirectly gains access to a victim‟s
social media account and then impersonates the victim by using that
account.16
A.

Creating a Fake Social Media Site Profile

Only a small number of states contain a statute explicitly
referring to Internet impersonation.17 In these states, the possible
another actual person through or on an Internet Web site or by other electronic means for
purposes of harming, intimidating, threatening, or defrauding another person is guilty of a
public offense”).
14
See Kay, supra note 11 (discussing cases in which an individual creates a fake profile);
see also In re Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 52 (involving a case where a teenager stole his
classmate‟s password).
15
Kay, supra note 11.
16
See, e.g., In re Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 52 (“Appellant used the victim‟s email
password and account to gain access to her Facebook account, where he posted, in her name,
prurient messages on two of her male friends‟ pages (walls) and altered her profile
description in a vulgar manner.”).
17
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(4) (establishing when an individual is liable for criminal
impersonation); CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5 (discussing the behavior that amounts to Internet
impersonation); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.07 (West 2011) (“A person commits an
offense if the person, without obtaining the other person‟s consent and with the intent to
harm, defraud, intimidate, or threaten any person, uses the name or persona of another
person to: (1) create a web page on a commercial social networking site or other Internet
website; or (2) post or send one or more messages on or through a commercial social
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outcome of a case in which a perpetrator creates a fake profile to the
detriment of the victim will be clear simply by reading the language
of the state‟s statute. Conversely, the potential results of such cases
in states in which statutes are silent on issues of Internet
impersonation will not be as clear, and furthermore, may lead to
jurisdictional splits concerning this emerging issue.18
A premier example of creating a fake social media site profile
to defraud or otherwise harm the victim comes from a case in New
Jersey.19 The case involves Dana Thornton, a woman who created a
fake Facebook profile for her ex-boyfriend, a narcotics detective.20
In the detective‟s fake Facebook profile, Thornton posted that the
detective used drugs, hired prostitutes, and had herpes, including
statements such as, “I‟m an undercover narcotics detective that gets
high every day.”21 Thornton‟s attorney argued that the case should
be dismissed because there was no New Jersey identity theft statute
including Internet impersonation.22 The judge, however, refused to
dismiss the case because “the law is „clear and unambiguous‟ . . . and
does not specify the „means‟ by which the injury could occur.”23
Although the judge decided not to dismiss the case, it “could
be difficult to prosecute [Thornton] because of the way the New
Jersey law is written.”24 Under the New Jersey statute, a person is
guilty of identity theft if the person “impersonates another or assumes
a false identity and does an act in such assumed character or false
identity for the purpose of obtaining a benefit for himself or another
or to injure or defraud another.”25 The memorandum in support of
the bill for the New Jersey identity theft statute states that “personal
identifying information includes name, address, telephone number,
networking site or other Internet website, other than on or through an electronic mail
program or message board program.”).
18
Hansen, supra note 1 (paraphrasing Bradley Shear, a “lawyer who specializes in online
issues,” who said that New York and California are leading the way for Internet
impersonation cases and that he “expects to see more cases like this one in the near future”
in other states).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Ben Horowitz, Judge Rules Case of Belleville Woman‟s Fake Facebook Page Can
Proceed, NJ.COM (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/11/judge_rules_
case_of_fake_faceb.html.
22
Hansen, supra note 1.
23
Horowitz, supra note 21.
24
Hansen, supra note 1.
25
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 21-17 (West 2005).
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social security number, place of employment, employee identification
number, demand deposit account number, savings account number,
credit card number and mother‟s maiden name.”26
Evidently, the law is not as “clear and unambiguous” as the
judge presiding over Dana Thornton‟s case presumed it to be.27 In
fact, a thorough examination of the legislative intent behind the New
Jersey statute of identity suggests that the New Jersey Legislature
never intended its identity theft statute to encompass Internet
impersonation.28 The summary of the bill provides that the conduct
must satisfy three elements to rise to the level of a criminal offense:
(1) “obtaining and using personal identifying information” as
described in the bill; (2) absence of consent to obtain and use the
identifying information; and (3) an “intent[ion] to obtain a benefit.”29
Thornton clearly satisfied the first two elements when she used her
ex-boyfriend‟s name for the Facebook profile without his consent.30
However, there is potential for confusion and ambiguity with respect
to the third element.31 The term “benefit” as defined by the statute
“means, but is not limited to, any property, any pecuniary amount,
any services, any pecuniary amount sought to be avoided or any
injury or harm perpetrated on another where there is no pecuniary
value.”32 Because of the absence of a pecuniary interest, the only
substantive argument that the “benefit” element was satisfied was
that Thornton caused a non-pecuniary “injury or harm” to her exboyfriend; however, neither the bill nor the statute gives a definition
or any assistance in interpreting what constitutes a non-pecuniary
“injury or harm.”33
In a preliminary hearing, the judge refused to dismiss the case
because he believed that Thornton‟s impersonation “allegedly

26
Governor‟s Conditional Veto Message, Bill nos. 2414, 1638 and 2456, 2005 Main
Volume (N.J. 2005), available at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 21-17.
27
Horowitz, supra note 21.
28
See Governor‟s Conditional Veto Message, Bill no. 2414 (stating that personal
information be obtained and used without authorization and with intent to obtain a benefit in
order to constitute a criminal offense).
29
Id.
30
Horowitz, supra note 21.
31
See Governor‟s Conditional Veto Message, Bill no. 2414 (requiring “the intent to obtain
a benefit”).
32
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 21-17 (West 2005).
33
Id.; Governor‟s Conditional Veto Message, Bill no. 2414.
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„injured‟ the detective‟s reputation,” stating that the law “does not
specify the „means‟ by which the injury could occur.”34 The judge
did not, however, mention that the law failed to specify what type of
non-pecuniary “injury or harm” was necessary or what extent the
non-pecuniary “injury or harm” must be.35 Only with the broadest
interpretation of the statute can a reasonable person conclude that
Thornton‟s statement on her ex-boyfriend‟s fake Facebook profile is
sufficient to satisfy the non-pecuniary harm or injury requirement
under the benefit element.
Nevertheless, the judge “refused to dismiss” Thornton‟s case
and charged her with identity theft.36 The court that will adjudicate
this case will potentially run into similar difficulties in analyzing the
New Jersey identity theft statute, as the California court did in
analyzing the California identity theft statute in In re Rolando S.37 In
In re Rolando S., a juvenile defendant “gain[ed] access to [the
victim‟s] Facebook account,” and “posted, in her name, prurient
messages on two of her male friends‟ pages (walls) and altered her
profile description in a vulgar manner.”38 The California Court of
Appeals and the parties to the litigation applied California‟s
traditional identity theft statute.39 Under that statute, the perpetrator
is guilty if he “willfully obtains personal identifying information . . .
of another person, and uses that information for any unlawful
purpose . . . without the consent of that person.”40 Rolando argued
that his conduct did not satisfy an unlawful purpose as required under
the statute.41 The court analyzed the statute‟s legislative history to
determine what type of conduct falls under “any unlawful purpose” in
light of Rolando‟s argument that the term “unlawful purpose” was
34

Horowitz, supra note 21.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 21-17 (defining “benefit,” but failing to provide a definition
for “injury or harm”).
36
Horowitz, supra note 21.
37
129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 49 (Ct. App. 2011). The court went through a lengthy discussion in
order to successfully apply an Internet impersonation scenario to the outdated identity theft
statute, which was silent on Internet impersonation. Id. at 55-56.
38
Id. at 52. One such comment made by the defendant under the victim‟s name on a male
classmate‟s wall was as follows: “When we were dating we should have had sex. I always
thought you had a cute dick, maybe we can have sex sometime.” Id. at 52 n.2 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
39
Id. at 51-52.
40
CAL. PENAL CODE § 530.5 (West 2011).
41
In re Roland S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 53, 55.
35
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ambiguous.42
Through a lengthy and nebulous opinion, the California Court
of Appeals ultimately determined that the legislature intended
“unlawful purpose” to include acts prohibited by common law, such
as intentional civil torts.43 The court held that Rolando‟s messages
on the victim‟s Facebook profile constituted libel, which is an
intentional civil tort, and therefore satisfied the statutory language of
California‟s identity theft statute.44 The potential issues a New Jersey
court may face in determining what type of “harm or injury” is
sufficient for the New Jersey identity theft statute is analogous to the
dispute in In re Rolando S. concerning what satisfied an “unlawful
purpose” under the California identity theft statue. In light of In re
Rolando S., California immediately enacted a statute that specifically
made identity theft on the Internet illegal in order to prevent future
ambiguity.45
The New Jersey legislature also has acted to amend New
Jersey‟s identity theft statute to completely bar Internet
impersonation. The bill, which has passed the Assembly, is currently
before the Senate.46 The amended statute will undoubtedly clarify the
ambiguities that exist in New Jersey‟s identity theft statute
concerning Internet impersonation, but what effect will its enactment
have on Dana Thornton‟s case? Thornton‟s attorney argued that the
amendment of the law is exactly why “there was nothing illegal in
Thornton‟s alleged postings.”47 Alternatively, the prosecutor, Robert
Schwartz, argued that the amendment “is merely „a clarification‟ of
current law,” and that “[i]n no way are [the legislators] saying
electronic communication has been excluded” under the current
statute, and in “[n]o way did the Legislature ever intend for Ms.
Thornton to get away with this kind of conduct.”48
For the reasons discussed above, there is a possibility that the
court will hold that the language in the outdated identity theft statute
is too broad to include Thornton‟s actions as illegal. In that scenario,

42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id. at 55-56.
Id. at 56-57.
Id. at 57-58.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5 (West 2011) (criminalizing Internet impersonation).
Horowitz, supra note 21; see also Assemb. 2105, 215th Leg. (N.J. 2012).
Horowitz, supra note 21.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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there must be a determination on whether the amended statute could
retroactively apply to Dana Thornton.49 Under both the New Jersey
and Federal Constitutions, however, a legislative body is prohibited
form enacting “ex post facto” laws.50 An “ex post facto” law is
defined as “any statute which makes a prior act, that was innocent
when committed, a crime, which makes punishment for a crime more
burdensome after its commission, or which deprives a defendant of a
defense available when the act was committed.”51 Thus, if the court
holds that the outdated New Jersey identity theft statute did not apply
to Thornton‟s actions, it would be unconstitutional for any amended
statute to apply retroactively to Thornton‟s conduct.
Federal courts have had similar difficulties in attempting to
apply ambiguous statutory language to Internet impersonation
cases.52 In one of the most tragic online impersonation cases in the
last decade, a Missouri woman, Lori Drew, was prosecuted under
federal law when her atrocious actions led to the suicide of Megan
Meier, a thirteen-year-old classmate of Drew‟s daughter.53 Drew and
other co-conspirators registered a fictitious profile on the website
MySpace.com (“MySpace”), impersonating a boy named Josh
Evans.54 “The conspirators contacted Megan through the MySpace
network . . . using the Josh Evans pseudonym and began to flirt with
her over a number of days.”55 In one of the last communications with
Megan, “the conspirators had „Josh‟ tell Megan that he no longer
liked her and that „the world would be a better place without her in

49
See Edward A. Zunz, Jr. & Edwin F. Chociey, Jr., Review of Statutes And Other
Legislation, 40 N.J. PRAC., APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4.26 (2d ed. 2011)
(“Courts can apply statutes retroactively under appropriate circumstances, but courts
generally favor prospective application of statutes. Courts will use a two-part test to
determine whether a statute should apply retroactively; the first inquiry is whether the
legislature intended to give the statute retroactive application, and the second question is
whether the statute‟s retroactive application will result in either an unconstitutional
interference with vested rights or a manifest injustice.”).
50
U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 10, cl. 1; N.J. CONST., art. IV, § VII. par. 3 (amended 1947).
51
State v. T.P.M., 460 A.2d 167, 170 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983).
52
See, e.g., United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 458 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (stating that the
meaning of the elements in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) is controversial,
yet the court decided to apply it to Drew‟s case anyway).
53
Id. at 452.
54
Id.
55
Id.
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it.‟ ”56 Shortly thereafter, Megan committed suicide. 57
State and federal officials in Missouri decided not to
prosecute Drew due to the lack of applicable criminal charges that
corresponded with Drew‟s actions.58
The Missouri officials‟
acquiescence led to an array of public outrage and scrutiny.59 In
response, the Los Angeles United States Attorney‟s Office elected to
prosecute Drew under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(“CFAA”).60 The CFAA makes it a misdemeanor offense when a
defendant “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or
exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains . . . information from
any protected computer.”61 The court in Drew emphasized that the
central issue in the CFAA analysis was whether Drew‟s conscious
violations of MySpace‟s terms of service satisfied the statutory
language of the CFAA.62 The court held that Drew‟s breach of the
MySpace terms of services satisfied the intentional access or
exceeding authorized access element of the CFAA.63
The court then analyzed “whether basing a CFAA
misdemeanor violation . . . upon the conscious violation of a
website‟s terms of service runs afoul of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine.”64 “The void-for-vagueness doctrine has two prongs: a . . .
notice sufficiency requirement, and . . . a guideline setting element to
56

Id.
Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 452.
58
Amanda Harmon Cooley, Guarding Against a Radical Redefinition of Liability for
Internet Misrepresentation: The United States v. Drew Prosecution And the Computer Fraud
And Abuse Act, 14 J. INTERNET L. 1, 14 (2011) (citing David Hunn & Tim Bryant,
Newspaper Is Denied Access to FBI Records in Suicide Investigation, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Dec. 21, 2007, at C3, available at 2007 WLNR 25214100).
59
Id.
60
Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Supp. II 2008); see also Jennifer Steinhauer, Woman Found
Guilty in Web Fraud Tied to Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2008, at A25, available at 2008
WLNR 22673768. “Thomas P. O‟Brien, the United States attorney in Los Angeles,
prosecuted the case himself with two subordinates after law enforcement officials in
Missouri determined Ms. Drew had broken no local laws.” Id. The attorneys successfully
asserted jurisdiction on the ground that MySpace is based in Los Angeles, California. Id.
61
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
62
Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 458 (“[T]he primary question here is whether any conscious
violation of an Internet website‟s terms of service will cause an individual‟s contact with the
website via computer to become „intentionally access[ing] . . . without authorization‟ or
„exceeding authorization.‟ ” (second and third alternations in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
1030(a)(2) (Supp. II 2008))).
63
Id. at 461.
64
Id. at 464.
57
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govern law enforcement.”65 As for the notice prong, the court
articulated that the relevant question was “whether individuals of
„common intelligence‟ are on notice that a breach of a terms of
service contract can become a crime under the CFAA.”66 The court
held that these individuals would not be on notice, and therefore
concluded that the first prong of the doctrine was satisfied.67 With
respect to the second prong, the court held that “[t]reating a violation
of a website‟s terms of service . . . to be sufficient to constitute [the
CFAA‟s intentional unauthorized access element] would result in
transforming section 1030(a)(2)(C) into an overwhelmingly
overbroad enactment that would convert a multitude of otherwise
innocent Internet users into misdemeanant criminals.”68 The court
mentioned that the victim in the case, Megan, was also in clear
violation of one of the MySpace terms of service provisions, which
required MySpace users to be at least fourteen years old.69 The court
held that the second prong for the void-for-vagueness doctrine was
satisfied and concluded:
[I]f any conscious breach of a website‟s terms of
service is held to be sufficient by itself to constitute
intentionally accessing a computer without
authorization or in excess of authorization, the result
will be that section 1030(a)(2)(C) becomes a law “that
affords too much discretion to the police and too little
notice to citizens who wish to use the [Internet].”70
Many experts in the field of cyberlaw believe that the
government‟s argument in Drew was an unwarranted expansion of
what Congress intended the CFAA to include.71 It is likely that the

65

Id. at 463.
Id. at 464.
67
Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 464.
68
Id. at 466.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 467 (second alteration in original) (quoting City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41,
64 (1999)).
71
See Steinhauer, supra note 60 (quoting a former federal prosecutor who said, “As a
result of the prosecutor‟s highly aggressive, if not unlawful, legal theory . . . it is now a
crime to „obtain information‟ from a [w]eb site in violation of its terms and service. This
cannot be what Congress meant when it enacted the law, but now you have it”).
66
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Missouri officials were correct in not prosecuting Drew,72 and some
believe that the United States Attorney in Los Angeles had ulterior
motives in prosecuting Drew due to the increasing media coverage of
the case.73 Unquestionably, the egregious facts in Drew‟s case led to
her prosecution, but regardless of the motivations that gave rise to
Drew, Drew‟s counsel successfully convinced the court that the
CFAA does not apply to online impersonation.74 The decision in
Drew exemplifies the unexplainable absence of any applicable
federal statute explicitly dealing with the issue of Internet
impersonation.
Although Congress has not enacted a statute dealing with the
issue of impersonation on the Internet, New Jersey and other states
are following the lead of California and New York in criminalizing
the creation of fake social networking profiles to injure innocent
victims.75
The urgency for Congress to enact an Internet
impersonation statute is exemplified by the number of recent civil
cases which have been filed in different states against perpetrators
and social networking sites for damages resulting from creating a
fake social networking profile.76 It is fascinating to speculate what
the results of some of these civil cases would be if the perpetrators
were prosecuted under the applicable identity theft statute of that
state.
In Texas, two high-school students created a MySpace profile
impersonating their vice-principal, Anna Draker.77 The profile,
which appeared to be created by Draker, “contained her name, photo,
and place of employment, [and included] explicit and graphic sexual
references.”78 Draker claimed that the students created a website
containing “lewd, false, and obscene comments, pictures, and

72

Cooley, supra note 58.
See Steinhauer, supra note 60 (referring to Drew‟s attorney, who believed that “the trial
was grandstanding by Mr. Obrien [the United States Attorney on the case] in an effort to
keep his job”).
74
See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 464 (concluding that MySpace‟s “terms of service runs afoul
of the void-for-vagueness doctrine”).
75
Internet Imposters, STATE LEGISLATURES, May 1, 2010, at 8, available at 2010 WLNR
10273597 (stating that Internet impersonation bills were introduced in Pennsylvania and
West Virginia).
76
Kay, supra note 11, at 3.
77
Draker v. Schreiber, 271 S.W.3d 318, 320-21 (Tex. App. 2008).
78
Id. at 320.
73
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graphics that implied she was a lesbian.”79 Draker originally sued the
students for “defamation and libel per se, as well as [the students‟]
parents for negligence and gross negligence relating to the parents‟
supervision of the students‟ use of the [I]nternet.”80 Draker amended
her complaint multiple times and ultimately only a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress reached the Texas Court of
Appeals.81 The court denied Draker any relief for her claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress and her claim was
dismissed.82
In 2008, when Draker was decided, Texas had not yet passed
its “online impersonation” statute.83 At that time, the only option
available for prosecutors in such a case was to use the outdated Texas
identity theft statute, which stated that a person is guilty of identity
theft if he or she “with intent to harm or defraud another, obtains,
possesses, transfers, or uses an item of . . . [personal] identifying
information of another person without the other person‟s consent.”84
The old Texas statute was similar to the federal identity theft statute,
which was mainly concerned with protecting consumers from
financial injury.85 Under current Texas law, however, a person is
guilty of online impersonation, a third degree felony, when he or she
“create[s] a web page on a commercial social networking site” to
harm or defraud the victim.86 It is quite possible that the high-school
students in the Draker case would have been aggressively prosecuted
and likely held guilty under the current online impersonation
statute.87
B.

Stealing the Password of the Victim

The second way that an issue of identity theft on the Internet

79

Id. at 324.
Id. at 321.
81
Id.
82
Draker, 271 S.W.3d at 325.
83
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.07 (West 2011).
84
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.51 (West 2011).
85
18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (2006).
86
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.07.
87
See id. (holding a person liable if he or she “create[s] a web page on a commercial
social networking site” without consent); Draker, 271 S.W.3d at 320-21 (showing that the
students had created a fake profile without the consent of their principal).
80
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can potentially arise is when the perpetrator steals or somehow gains
access to the victim‟s social media account, and subsequently
impersonates that victim.88
Though the methodology of
impersonating the victim is different in such a case, courts and
legislatures have successfully applied identity theft statutes or state
and federal cyberstalking statutes.89 However, when the perpetrator
impersonates a victim by stealing his or her password, more
complications can arise: potential hackers may have the ability to
steal valuable financial information or inflict fatal viruses on the
victim‟s computer.90
Hacking into social media accounts has been linked to all
types of relationships, with dating relationships being the most
prominent.91 Close friends or couples usually do not think twice
about disclosing their passwords for Facebook or Twitter to each
other, but recent stories around the country emphasize the necessary
caution that must be exercised before disclosing such personal
information.92 One such case involves a twenty-five-year-old woman
from Minnesota who was recently charged with “taking over [her
former friend‟s] Facebook account to send messages such as „fat
lard,‟ „you are so gross,‟ and „the game‟s only begun.‟ ”93 The

88

See, e.g., In re Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
See, e.g., Tom Zeller Jr., Despite Laws, Stalkers Roam on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 17, 2006, at A1, available at 2006 WLNR 6394945 (applying cyberstalking statutes to
cases where the perpetrator gains access to the victim‟s profile).
90
See Facebook Fraud: Identity Theft
Through Social Networking,
PROTECTMYID, http://www.protectmyid.com/images/education_center/pdf/050Typesof
Fraud/7_types%20of%20fraud_social%20networking.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2012)
(“Variations on many well-known email scams have quickly made their way onto
networking sites. The sites work hard to identify and prevent misuse of their systems, but
phishing scams, malware, and cons for cash have all occurred.”).
91
See Joy Powell, Stalkers and Harassers Plunge into Social Media Beware Who Your
Friends Really Are: More People Are Taking Over Accounts, Creating Fake Profiles in “A
New Kind of Crime,” STAR TRIBUNE, Jan. 15, 2011, at 01A, available at 2011 WLNR
1017657. The author quotes Jill Oliveira, spokeswoman at the Minnesota Bureau of
Criminal Apprehension, stating: “We have had a few cases with people initiating false
Facebook accounts and MySpace accounts . . . . Usually the person who starts the account is
an ex-boyfriend or ex-girlfriend. They tend to have a vendetta against the individual and
have access to pictures to upload to the false accounts.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
92
See id. (discussing multiple cases of former friends or exes who steal passwords,
including a woman from Minnesota who faces felony charges for stealing “others‟ Facebook
and email accounts to send hateful messages”).
93
Id.
89
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Minnesota woman now has a “restraining order barring her from
impersonating her former friend and [her former friend‟s] husband on
Facebook.”94 In another case, a twenty-six-year-old man from
Minnesota was “recently convicted of hijacking a neighbor‟s e-mail
to send pornographic photos to the neighbor‟s co-workers.”95
Other times, victims may have no idea who hacked into their
account, making it very difficult for officials to find the perpetrator
and making it harder for the victim to escape this nightmare.96 Claire
E. Miller, a publishing executive in Manhattan, was one of the many
victims of what has been defined as cyberstalking.97 Cyberstalking
appears in various different forms: “Installing spyware on a target‟s
computer[;] . . . GPS (global positioning system) surveillance of
the . . . victim[]; posting personal or false and humiliating
information about the victim on the Internet; sending harassing
emails and text message[s;] and using social media such as Facebook
or Twitter to post false and humiliating information.”98 Miller had
been victimized by constant and disturbing “phone calls, e-mail
messages[,] and even late-night visits from strange men” who were
seeking delivery on provocative promises made to them by an online
impersonator.99
Unfortunately, Miller is not alone in this battle. Recent
studies show that “[forty percent] of women have experienced dating
violence via social media [sites] . . . [twenty percent] of online
stalkers use social networking to stalk their victims[,] [and] [thirtyfour percent] of female college students [along with fourteen percent]
of male students have broken into a romantic partner‟s email.”100 A
psychologist in private practice in Long Island, New York, Elizabeth
Carll, explained that victims of cyberstalking experience many
negative emotional reactions.101 Carll stated : “ „If you‟re harassed in

94

Id.
Powell, supra note 91.
96
Zeller, supra note 89 (demonstrating that in half the cases, the victim and perpetrator
are complete strangers).
97
Id.
98
Charlene Laino, „Cyberstalking‟: Worse Than In-Person Harassment?, WEBMD (Aug.
8, 2011), http://www.webmd.com/balance/news/20110808/cyberstalking-worse-than-inperson-harassment.html.
99
Zeller, supra note 89.
100
Laino, supra note 98.
101
Id. (“[V]ictims of cyberstalking have a wide range of emotional reactions, including
95
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school or work, you can come home to a safe environment[,] . . .
[but] [i]f you‟re cyberstalked, it can be all the time, no matter where
you are.‟ ”102 Carll stressed that people must protect themselves from
impersonation and cyberstalking by creating secure passwords and
not giving their passwords to anyone.103
While some perpetrators hack into a victim‟s social media
account for the purpose of stalking or tormenting the victim, other
perpetrators steal the passwords of innocent users for the purpose of
obtaining valuable financial information.104 Many well-known email
scams that have existed for years are migrating their way into social
networking sites.105 One example is a scam on Twitter in which
messages are sent to Twitter members impersonating one of the
members‟ friends.106 These messages are actually sent by trained
hackers and carry links “designed to steal passwords and recruit
people for work-at-home schemes to [labor] as money mules,” so that
the hackers can set up “bank accounts to help thieves extract
[finances] from hijacked financial accounts.”107 In early 2012,
Facebook had trouble with a developing scam in which hackers
hijacked accounts and then impersonated Facebook security.108 The
impersonated security team sent a personal message to friends,
reading: “Last Warning: Your Facebook account will be turned off
because someone has reported you. Please do re-confirm your
account security by: (link).”109 The link in the message then sent the
potential victim to a fake page that looked like Facebook, but was
actually an external domain; once there, users were told to enter their
personal information and credit card information.110
Another similar scam arises when a thief steals a person‟s
high levels of stress, anxiety, fear, and helplessness as well as nightmares, hypervigilance,
undereating or overeating, and sleeping difficulties.”).
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Facebook Fraud, supra note 90, at 1.
105
Id.
106
Byron Acohido, Scammers Hit Twitter with Tainted Tweet Storm Cybervillains
Repurpose E-mail Spam Techniques, USA TODAY, Sept. 29, 2009, at 7A, available at 2009
WLNR 19162424.
107
Id.
108
Hackers Impersonate Security Team on Facebook, FACECROOKS (Jan. 17, 2012),
http://facecrooks.com/Scam-Watch/hackers-impersonate-security-team-on-facebook.html.
109
Id.
110
Id.
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online identity and subsequently sends a desperate plea, in a message
format, for cash to the member‟s online friends.111 A typical message
may state, “I‟m traveling abroad and all of my money and documents
have been lost. Please wire me $500 so I can get home.”112 Naïve,
but concerned, family members and friends may be tricked by the
hacker and send the money.113 Hackers can obtain passwords
through phishing scams or malware, and by simply downloading an
application or taking an online quiz; thus, innocent victims can be
providing hackers with the ability to track future activities for the
purpose of accessing the victims‟ identification names and passwords
for financial accounts.114
Appropriate officials may have trouble ascertaining the
identities of hackers who steal passwords through social networking
sites; however, if the identities are discovered, federal and state
cyberlaws exist to deal with these issues.115 In the federal context, as
long as there is an economic detriment to the victim, the CFAA can
be utilized to prosecute impersonating hackers.116 On the state level,
most states have identity theft statutes explicitly prohibiting online
impersonation to obtain financial records.117
Unlike the difficulties of prosecuting impersonators who
create completely fake profiles, there is substantially less difficulty in
prosecuting online imposters for the act of stealing passwords or
personal information, which is interpreted as a medium to “cyberstalk” victims.118 California and forty-five other states have enacted
anti-cyberstalking laws within the last decade; on the federal level,
women can also seek protection under the “Violence Against Women
and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005,”119 which
111

Facebook Fraud, supra note 90, at 1.
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 1-2.
115
Zeller, supra note 89.
116
18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2006).
117
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2008(A) (2004) (West); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
190.25(1) (McKinney 2008); CAL. PENAL CODE § 530.5(a) (West 2011).
118
See Zeller, supra note 89 (demonstrating how a former security guard was sentenced to
six years in prison under the California cyberstalking law for using his ex-girlfriend‟s
personal information to impersonate her in chat rooms and personals sites. While
impersonating his girlfriend, “[h]e posted rape fantasies . . . [and] begged strangers to deliver
on them” after giving strangers his ex-girlfriend‟s home address).
119
Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005,
112
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“updated telephone harassment law to include computer
communications.”120
An issue that now presents itself is, what type of Internet
impersonation would not be considered cyberstalking and therefore
not be prosecutable under the cyberstalking statutes.121
The
determinative factor on whether a perpetrator will be prosecuted
under an identity theft statute or a cyberstalking statute seems to be
the foreseeable harm from the perpetrator‟s impersonation.122 In In
re Rolando S., a teenager was prosecuted under the California
identity theft statute, not the cyberstalking statute, when he gained
access to a classmate‟s Facebook page and posted explicit sexual
material on it.123 On the other hand, a California man, Gary S.
Dellapenta, who impersonated his ex-girlfriend by stealing her
personal information to access a dating website, causing multiple
men to arrive at her house, was prosecuted under the California
cyberstalking statute.124 The foreseeable harm for the victim in In re
Rolando S. was sufficiently less than the foreseeable harm to
Dellapenta‟s ex-girlfriend because the latter was subjected to the
arrival of strange men at her doorstep.
Thus, it seems that cyberstalking statutes are often triggered
when the victim is more likely to be placed in reasonable fear of his
Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006).
120
Zeller, supra note 89.
121
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 653.2(a) (West 2010). Section 653.2(a) states:
Every person who, with intent to place another person in reasonable fear
for his or her safety, or the safety of the other person‟s immediate
family, by means of an electronic communication device, and without
consent of the other person, and for the purpose of imminently causing
that other person unwanted physical contact, injury, or harassment, by a
third party, electronically distributes, publishes, e-mails, hyperlinks, or
makes available for downloading, personal identifying information,
including, but not limited to, a digital image of another person, or an
electronic message of a harassing nature about another person, which
would be likely to incite or produce that unlawful action, is guilty of a
misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in a county jail, by a fine of
not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine and
imprisonment. Id.
122
Compare In re Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 51-52 (electing to prosecute defendant
under an identity theft statute because the posting of embarrassing comments was not very
dangerous), with Zeller, supra note 89 (sentencing ex-boyfriend who posted rape fantasies
under his ex-girlfriend‟s name under the cyberstalking statute).
123
In re Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 51-52.
124
Zeller, supra note 89; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 653.2.
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or her safety.125 However, prosecutors are more likely to utilize
identity theft statutes when the online impersonation caused some
sort of harm to the victim, but the victim was not placed in reasonable
fear of his or her safety.126 Thus, the controlling factor to determine
what statutory scheme should be used is the degree of harm the
victim confronts.127
III.

APPLICABLE STATUTES CONCERNING IDENTITY THEFT ON
THE INTERNET
A.

Original Identity Theft Statutes

The earliest identity theft statute in the United States was
enacted in 1996 in Arizona.128 The Arizona statute renders a
perpetrator guilty of identity theft when he or she:
[K]nowingly takes . . . or uses any personal identifying
information . . . of another person[,] . . . including a
real or fictitious person or entity, without the consent
of that other person or entity, with the intent to obtain
or use the other person‟s or entity‟s identity for any
unlawful purpose or to cause loss to a person or entity
whether or not the person or entity actually suffers any
economic loss as a result of the offense . . . .129
The Arizona legislature sought to deter potential perpetrators by
stressing the severity of the offense and labeling the crime of identity
theft as a class 4 felony.130 In Arizona, a class 4 felony “translates
into a sentence of between one-and-one-half and three years in prison

125
See In re Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 51-52 (prosecuting defendant under the
California identity theft statute and not the cyberstalking statute).
126
See, e.g., Zeller, supra note 89 (sentencing ex-boyfriend who posted rape fantasies
under his ex-girlfriend‟s name under the cyberstalking statute).
127
Compare Zeller, supra note 89 (prosecuting under cyber stalking statute because
conduct created a risk of reasonable harm), with In re Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 51-52
(applying identity theft statute when victim‟s Facebook page was used by defendant to post
obscene material because no great risk of harm was generated).
128
Catherine Pastrikos, Comment, Identity Theft Statutes: Which Will Protect Americans
the Most, 67 ALB. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (2004); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2008
(2004) (West).
129
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2008.
130
Id. at § 13-2008(F); see also Pastrikos, supra note 128.
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for first time offenders.”131 Even today, Arizona‟s statute is silent on
the issue of identity theft on the Internet.132 However, as with laws in
other jurisdictions, the excessively broad language in the Arizona
statute would probably force many Arizona judges to determine that
knowingly taking or using another person‟s social media account
“without the consent of that other person” and “with the intent to
obtain or use the other person‟s” social media account to “cause loss”
to the other person133 would satisfy the identity theft statute.134
In 1998, two years after Arizona‟s state statute was
implemented, Congress enacted the Federal Identity Theft and
Assumption Deterrence Act.135 The Act made it a federal crime to
knowingly possess or use, “without lawful authority, a means of
identification of another person with the intent to commit . . . any
unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or . . . any
applicable State or local law . . . .”136 The Act addressed identity
theft on the federal level in two ways: it “strengthen[ed] the criminal
laws governing identity theft,” and it focused on the consumers as the
victims.137 The federal law on identity theft is specifically directed at
economic losses suffered by consumers.138 This is in direct contrast
to the Arizona statute, which explicitly states that economic loss to
the victim is not required.139 Thus, under the federal statute, or any
statute similar, the prosecution of a perpetrator of identity theft on a
social media site for non-economic purposes would likely be
dismissed.140
131

Pastrikos, supra note 128; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702(D) (2004) (West).
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2008.
133
Id.
134
See Hansen, supra note 1 (paraphrasing a judge who held that the prosecution of a
woman for impersonating her ex-boyfriend by creating a fake Facebook account would
proceed, even though the New Jersey statute was silent concerning electronic
communications, specifically Internet communications).
135
18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (2006); Pastrikos, supra note 128, at 139-40; see also Charles
Harwood, Dir., Identity Theft (Jan. 29, 2001), available at 2001 WL 85693, at *1.
136
18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7).
137
Harwood, supra note 135.
138
See S. REP. NO. 105-274, at 4 (1998) (listing that the second purpose of the bill is “to
recognize the individual victims of identity theft crimes, and establish their right to
restitution to include all costs related to regaining good credit or reputation.”).
139
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2008(A) (2004) (West).
140
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (requiring a financial detriment as a key element to
the statute), with N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-113.20(a) (West 2005) (requiring a financial
detriment as a key element to the statutory provision).
132
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New York Identity Theft Statute

Under New York law, “A person is guilty of criminal
impersonation in the second degree when he . . . [i]mpersonates
another by communication by [I]nternet website . . . with intent to
obtain a benefit or injure or defraud another . . . .”141 New York was
the first state to implement such explicit language concerning identity
theft on the Internet into a separate subdivision of its identity theft
statute.142 On March 23, 2007, the New York Senate and Assembly
unanimously approved the memorandum in support of the legislative
bill, which amended the identity theft statute to incorporate Internet
impersonation.143
The memorandum stressed that Internet
“impersonation has become an increasingly large problem in the
United States” because of the ease of impersonating another via
Internet communications.144 It further directed that “misrepresenting
oneself through the use of the Internet become a crime in order to
deter the plethora of cases presently occurring.”145
The memorandum also mentioned an incident of Internet
impersonation in Suffolk County that prompted the Senate to take
action.146 In this incident, Michael Valentine, a Suffolk County
police officer, “hack[ed] into the Yahoo e-mail account of a woman
he had briefly dated and posing as her [during] online
The Suffolk County District Attorney
communications.”147
discovered that Mr. Valentine “accessed the woman‟s personal
profile on the dating site Match.com, sending electronic „winks‟ and
other [electronic] communications to 70 different men on the site.”148
Two men even showed up to the woman‟s house after
communicating with Valentine through her Match.com profile.149
The memorandum emphasized countless numbers of
documented cases like Valentine‟s, “where perpetrators gain access
into another person[‟s] account and pose as them through the use of
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(4) (McKinney 2008).
See id.
S. 4053, 2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2008).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Zeller, supra note 89.
Id.
Id.
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online communications.”150 The New York legislature‟s findings
were indeed accurate, with similar Internet impersonation horror
stories appearing all over the country.151 The New York legislature
has been a pioneer in the effort to protect victims of Internet identity
theft, as is evidenced by the new identity theft statute.152 Other
jurisdictions would be wise to follow the footsteps of the New York
Senate by creating an explicit subdivision dealing with Internet
impersonation within their respective identity theft statutes, thus
eliminating the potential ambiguity an identity theft statute may have
concerning internet impersonation.
C.

California Identity Theft Statute

California took an even a bigger step than New York when it
enacted its Internet identity theft statute in January 2011.153 Rather
than just adding a separate subdivision on Internet impersonation like
New York, California created a completely separate statute in order
to protect its citizens from Internet identity theft.154 The statute states
that “any person who knowingly and without consent credibly
impersonates another actual person through or on an Internet Web
site . . . for purposes of harming, intimidating, threatening, or
defrauding another person is guilty” of identity theft.155
Unlike previous statutes, section 528.5 made specific
purposes such as “harming, intimidating, threatening, or defrauding”
illegal after the perpetrator has gained access to the victim‟s
profile.156 The California legislature‟s implementation of these
specific purposes reached the heart of the most devastating effects of
Internet impersonation.
Traditionally, “harming, intimidating,
157
threatening, or defrauding”
a person by impersonation on the

150

N.Y. S. 4053.
See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 1 (“Bradley Shear, a Bethesda, Md., lawyer who
specializes in online issues, said he expects to see more cases like this one in the near
future.”); Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449.
152
Hansen, supra note 1.
153
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5 (West 2011).
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
151
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Internet has only given rise to civil, but not criminal, liability.158
However, California retreated from this traditional notion by
criminalizing Internet impersonation.159
In response to the vague reasoning the California Court of
Appeals provided in In re Rolando S., the California legislature
enacted section 528.5.160 The lengthy and ambiguous analysis
concerning the legislature‟s intent on what qualifies as an unlawful
purpose in In re Rolando S. was clarified by the enactment of section
528.5; California‟s current Internet impersonation statute is one of the
most sophisticated statutes concerning Internet identity theft.161 In a
world where young people naively divulge too much information on
social networking sites, sophisticated and explicit statutes dealing
with Internet impersonation are absolutely necessary. Experts
believe that Internet impersonation cases are on the rise,162 but it
seems that only a few states are taking the appropriate legislative
steps to deter potential perpetrators.163

D.

Other States’ Statutory Schemes Corresponding
with Online Impersonation

In late 2011, Texas enacted an “online impersonation” statute,
which makes it a third degree felony when a perpetrator “without
obtaining the other person‟s consent and with the intent to harm,
defraud, intimidate, or threaten any person, uses the name or persona
of another person to . . . create a web page on a commercial social
networking site or other Internet website; or . . . post . . . messages on
or through a commercial social networking site.”164 The Texas

158

Kay, supra note 11, at 17.
See In re Rolando S., 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 58 (finding appellant‟s conduct to be a
criminal offense).
160
See id. at 55-56 (“[T]he Senate Committee report for the bill introducing the
amendment makes clear that the purpose of the „any unlawful purpose‟ language was to
broaden the scope of punishable conduct.”); CAL. PENAL. CODE § 528.5.
161
See CAL. PENAL. CODE § 528.5.
162
Hansen, supra note 1.
163
See Internet Imposters, supra note 75 (showing that California, New York,
Pennsylvania, and West Virginia were the few states to introduce Internet impersonation
bills).
164
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.07 (a)(1)(2) (West 2011).
159
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statute contains effective statutory language to criminalize both
methods of online impersonation.165 Provision (a)(1) explicitly
prohibits a person from “creat[ing] a web page on a commercial
social networking site,” and unambiguously criminalizes any person
who creates a fake profile impersonating another person with the
purpose to “harm, defraud, intimidate, or threaten” that person.166
Under (a)(2) of the statute, a person is guilty if he or she “post[s] . . .
one or more messages . . . through a commercial social networking
site” while using the name of another person.167 This subdivision
implicitly applies to the stealing method of Internet impersonation
and a Texas perpetrator will undoubtedly be found guilty under the
statute if he or she gains access to a victim‟s account by stealing
personal information and subsequently purports to be that person by
sending lewd messages within the victim‟s social network.168
Unlike Texas, some states would have an immense amount of
difficulty in attempting to prosecute a perpetrator for either of the two
methods of online impersonation. For example, North Carolina has
an identity theft statute that makes it illegal for a person to use
another‟s identifying information “for the purposes of making
financial or credit transactions.”169 North Carolina also has a cyberbullying statute that makes it illegal to “[b]uild a fake profile or [w]eb
site” if “the intent [was] to intimidate or torment a minor.”170 Thus,
the North Carolina legislature is only concerned with Internet identity
theft in the financial context and in protecting minors.171 As many
cases around the nation point out, however, online impersonation on
social media sites can cause serious issues outside the financial realm
and affect victims of all ages.172

165

See id. (covering cases where an impersonator either creates the web page, or posts
messages on the victim‟s already existing web page, without the victim‟s consent).
166
Id.
167
Id. at § 33.07 (a)(2).
168
See id. (criminalizing Internet impersonation).
169
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-113.20(a) (West 2005).
170
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-458.1(a)(1)(a) (West 2009).
171
See id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-113.20.
172
Zeller, supra note 89 (discussing multiple cases of women over the age of eighteen
who suffered serious consequences from a perpetrator who impersonated their identities
online).
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IDEAL STATUTE AND OTHER SOLUTIONS TO PREVENT THE
HARMS OF IDENTITY THEFT ON THE INTERNET
A.

Ideal Statute

As this Comment has explained, identity theft on the Internet
is a real and serious issue in our society.173 States that do not
implement sophisticated statutes which explicitly incorporate
different methods of online impersonation are subjecting their
citizens to potentially disastrous consequences.174 Outdated identity
theft statutes that are mainly concerned with financial detriments are
not sufficient to encompass online impersonation within their
statutory framework.175 On the other hand, states that enacted a
statute or subdivision to prevent online impersonation are at the
forefront of protecting the psychological and emotional well being of
potential victims.176
Unfortunately, “[t]he Internet knows no jurisdictional
boundaries,” and states such as California and New York may have
trouble in enforcing online impersonation statutes if the perpetrator
lives outside of the state.177 There is no question that every state
should make an effort to produce some type of legislation dealing
with online impersonation; however, the only way to successfully
punish and deter online impersonation is for Congress to enact a
federal statute that explicitly recognizes and prohibits online
impersonation through social networking media sites.178 An ideal
federal statute should be based on the current New York and
California statutes, which acknowledge the two different methods for
online impersonation within the statutory language and recognize
specific types of websites that are susceptible to online
173

See supra Part II. A-B.
See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 452 (showing that a thirteen-year-old-girl committed suicide
after her classmate‟s mother impersonated a young boy to ridicule her).
175
See id. at 464 (holding that the CFAA did not encompass online impersonation); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (2006); Draker, 271 S.W.3d at 325 (holding that two teens
impersonating their principal were not even subject to civil liability).
176
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(4) (McKinney 2008); see also CAL. PENAL CODE §
528.5 (West 2011).
177
Hansen, supra note 1 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bradley Shear, Esq.).
178
See 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) (indicating that the current federal identity theft statute
does not adequately recognize online impersonation); 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006) (showing
how the CFAA similarly does not adequately recognize online impersonation).
174
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impersonation.179
The New York and the California statutes use similar
statutory language to identify the potential actions that give rise to
online impersonation.180 The New York statute holds a perpetrator
guilty of criminal impersonation if he or she “[i]mpersonates another
by communication by [I]nternet website or electronic means.”181
Similarly, the California statute holds a person guilty of
impersonation when he or she “credibly impersonates another actual
person through or on an Internet [w]eb site or by other electronic
means.”182 These statutes are unnecessarily broad because online
impersonation, with respect to social media sites, can occur in only
two ways: either by stealing personal information to gain access or by
creating a fake profile.183 Thus, an ideal statute should explicitly
state that a person would be guilty of criminal impersonation if he or
she impersonates another person by creating a fake profile of another
person or by wrongfully gaining access to the victim‟s account. In
order to stay on the safe side a term such as “or [by other] electronic
means,” which is evident in the New York and California statutes,
should follow the two methods.184
The next phrase that is required within the statutory
framework is to identify what type of conduct and injury will be
punishable when an impersonation occurs.185 The New York online
impersonation statute requires the potential perpetrator to act “with
[the] intent to obtain a benefit or injure or defraud another,”186 while
the California statute also includes “harming, intimidating, [and]
threatening” the victim as punishable conduct.187 In many situations,
it may be difficult to ascertain whether a perpetrator‟s actions
actually “injure or defraud” the victim, but the victim nevertheless
experiences severe psychological or emotional harm.188 This is
179

See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(4); CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5.
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(4); CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5.
181
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(4).
182
CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5.
183
Facebook Fraud, supra note 90.
184
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(4); CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5.
185
See Horowitz, supra note 21 (discussing a dispute over whether there was sufficient
injury under the applicable statute).
186
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(4).
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CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5.
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precisely why an ideal statute would mimic the types of conduct
listed in the California statute.189 The four types of conduct listed in
the California statute protect potential victims from a wide array of
foreseeable danger, while simultaneously not transforming an
innocuous act of online impersonation into a crime.190
Finally, it is imperative for an ideal statute to include
examples of the types of websites that are susceptible to online
impersonation; however, this list would not be exclusive or
exhaustive, and would only provide examples.191 Though social
media sites are the hotbed for online impersonation, other Internet
websites such as dating websites, email websites, and other
interactive sites can all lead to online impersonation and give rise to
all types of negative consequences for victims.192 In fact, some of the
most dangerous online impersonation cases arise from dating
websites when the perpetrator convinces random people to come to
the victim‟s house.193 Other horror stories include victims who are
terrorized for months because the perpetrator gained access to the
victim‟s email account and subsequently stole personal information
to harm the victim.194 The New York statute does not explicitly
recognize these types of examples,195 whereas the California statute
states that “ „electronic means‟ shall include opening an e-mail
account or an account or profile on a social networking Internet
[w]eb site.”196 An ideal statute would define Internet websites and
explicitly state that Internet websites would include, and not be
limited to, social networking sites, email websites, dating websites,
and other Internet websites requiring personal information to gain
access.

suicide after her classmate‟s mom impersonated a young boy with the purpose to ridicule
her); Zeller, supra note 89 (giving examples of two men who gave their ex-girlfriends‟
personal information to random men through the ex-girlfriends‟ dating profiles).
189
See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5.
190
Id.
191
See Zeller, supra note 89 (demonstrating that online impersonation can occur on dating
websites, email websites, and online personals, in addition to social media sites).
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(4) (McKinney 2008).
196
CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5(c) (West 2011).
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Collective Effort from Society to Prevent Online
Impersonation

The trend to outlaw online impersonation is growing quite
rapidly, yet a substantial majority of states do not have online
impersonation statutes.197 This means that there are a plethora of
victims, especially children and teenagers, in the United States who
are subject to being impersonated with no statutory protection
available. This is precisely why people must protect themselves and
their children through simple, but very effective, proactive steps to
secure their social media networking accounts.198
Many sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, have “remember
password” functions that allow users to enter the websites account
without manually entering their password.199 Social media site users
should avoid these types of automatic login features and manually
login in every time they enter their social media account to protect
themselves from impersonation.200 Social media site users should
also be aware of the dangers present when not logging off properly
from their accounts.201 Because logging out properly after every
session will protect users from online impersonation, parents or
caregivers would be wise to relay this message to children who
frequently are the most likely to avoid these safety precautions.202
Another simple but very efficient method to protect oneself
Experts
from impersonation is to use strong passwords.203
recommend using passwords that contain a combination of upper and
197

See Hansen, supra note 1.
See Rob Frappier, Protecting Your Teen from Online Impersonation, IKEEPSAFE (July
25, 2011), http://www.ikeepsafe.org/cyberbullying-2/protecting-your-teen-from-onlineimpersonation/ (listing the steps that parents can take in order to protect their children).
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Linda McCarthy, Keith Watson & Denise Weldon-Siviy, A Guide to Facebook
Security: For Young Adults, Parents, and Educators, FACEBOOK, available at
http://www.facebook.com/safety/attachment/Guide%20to%20Facebook%20Security.pdf
(last visited Jan. 8, 2013).
202
See id. (“Logging out of Facebook when you‟re not using it is a simple and effective
way to protect your account. Many people think that if they close the web page or exit the
browser that also logs them out of Facebook. It doesn‟t.”); Frappier, supra note 198 (“In
addition to telling your kids to skip the remember password function, you should remind
them to always log off after a social media session.”).
203
Impersonation and Fraudulent Use, UNIV. OF TORONTO, http://www.enough.utoronto.ca/
computeruse/frauduse.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2013).
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lower-case letters, numbers, and symbols.204 Strong passwords
should not consist of “common words in the dictionary, or obvious
things” such as one‟s birthday.205 Further, users are advised to take
further precaution and protect these passwords by not writing them
down and not posting them or storing them on their computers.206
Recently, Facebook has taken its own measures to prevent
online impersonation on its website.207 Facebook created the
“REPORT/BLOCK THIS PERSON” feature, which is available on
the bottom-left side of every Facebook profile.208 This feature
enables users to report imposters who are impersonating victims and
authorizes the Facebook security team to catch the perpetrators.209
However, some of the reports that the Facebook security team
receives are fraudulent, and thus another way in which some
perpetrators harass victims.210 In order to circumvent this problem,
Facebook security requires that the complainant give a valid phone
number.211 The security team then sends a verification code to that
phone number, and once the complainant enters the code into the
report, the security team begins its investigation.212 Facebook users
can also use the report/block feature to report “businesses pretending
to be people, and [even] hate groups masquerading as people.”213
These types of reports do not require any additional steps beyond
clicking on the hyperlink on the bottom-left side of the webpage.214
Twitter, which is best known for the ability to interact with
celebrities, has created its own method to battle online
impersonation.215 Twitter uses a “Verified Accounts” function that
204

Id.
Id.
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See McCarthy et al., supra note 201 (teaching Facebook users how to report
impersonators).
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209
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
212
McCarthy et al., supra note 201.
213
Id.
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Id.
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See Susan M. Brazas, Twitter Verified Accounts and Protecting Identities,
LAWYERS.COM,
http://communications-media.lawyers.com/privacy-law/Twitter-VerifiedAccounts-and-Protecting-Identities.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2013) (“Twitter has announced
that it is launching „Verified Accounts‟ in an effort to protect the integrity of its account
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proves the integrity of the profile.216 When a public official, agency,
or other well-known profile is stamped with the “Verified Account”
approval, then that profile is indeed what it purports be.217
Social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter have made
valiant efforts to protect users from online impersonation. However,
the only way individuals can truly protect themselves is to be aware
of online impersonation and be proactive in limiting their exposure to
potential risks. Social media users would be wise to keep personal
information, such as their passwords, absolutely private and not
hesitate to report or seek help from an external source when they fear
their identity may have been impersonated.
V.

CONCLUSION

Social networking sites are here to stay and it is the
responsibility of the federal government and every state to protect
individuals from perpetrators who seek to impersonate potential
innocent victims through the use of such sites. Whether the method
is by creating a fake profile or stealing personal information to access
the victim‟s profile, Internet impersonation can be severely
detrimental to potential victims. The weakest people in our society
are those who decide to anonymously bash others on the Internet.
These people deserve to be at least mildly punished and deterred
from engaging in this conduct in the future. Unfortunately, only a
handful of states have implemented statutes or subdivisions that
explicitly concern identity theft on the Internet, or more specifically,
online impersonation.218 Some states possess outdated identity theft
statutes that need to be modified in order to prevent difficulties when
dealing with online impersonation.219 As our world becomes more
dependent on the Internet, so must our laws.

holders‟ identities.”).
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.25(4) (McKinney 2008); CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5
(West 2011); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.07 (West 2011).
219
See 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7); see also Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 464 (holding that the CFAA
did not encompass online impersonation); Draker, 271 S.W.3d at 325 (holding that two teens
impersonating their principal were not subject to civil liability).
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